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1 Introduction
A crucial implication of Mankiw’s (1987) revenue-smoothing (or optimal
seigniorage) hypothesis is that higher tax rates are associated with higher
inflation rates (and nominal interest rates). There have been many attempts
to test this hypothesis. For example, Mankiw (1987) and Poterba and Rotem-
berg (1990) using the OLS method find support of the hypothesis. However,
more general tests (based on the cointegration and/or VAR methodology)
by Trehan and Walsh (1990), Ghosh (1995), Evans and Amey (1996), and
Serletis and Schorn (1999) generally reject revenue smoothing.
The present paper extends the literature by testing whether the inflation
rate moves one-for-one with the marginal tax rate in the long run, using
the new average marginal tax rate series constructed by Stephenson (1998)
and the long-horizon regression approach developed by Fisher and Seater
(1993). Long-horizon regressions have received a lot of attention in the re-
cent economics and finance literature, because studies based on long-horizon
variables seem to find significant results where short-horizon regressions com-
monly used in economics and finance have failed.
In what follows, we provide a brief summary of Mankiw’s (1987) theory of
optimal seigniorage and of the econometric approach developed by Fisher and
Seater (1993). In section 4, we discuss the data, investigate the integration
properties of the variables, and present the results. The paper closes with a
brief summary and conclusion.
2 The Theory of Optimal Seigniorage
Following Mankiw (1987), let Y be the exogenous level of real output and τ
the tax rate on output. The revenue raised by this tax is τY . It is assumed
that the government finances expenditure in excess of taxes from seigniorage.
Assuming that the demand for money is described by the quantity equation,
M/P = kY , the real revenue from seigniorage is
M˙
P
=
M˙
M
M
P
= (π + g)kY
where π is the inflation rate and g is the growth rate of real output. The
total real tax revenue, T , is therefore the sum of the receipts from direct
taxation, τY , and seigniorage, (π + g)kY . That is, T = τY + (π + g)kY .
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The social costs of taxation and inflation are assumed homogenous in
output and denoted by f(τ)Y and h(π)Y , respectively, where f 0 > 0, h0 > 0
and f 00 > 0, h00 > 0. The government’s goal is to minimize, with respect to τ
and π, the expected present value of the social losses
Et
∞X
j=0
βj [f(τt+j) + h(πt+j)]Y
subject to the present value budget constraint
∞X
j=0
βjGt+j +Bt =
∞X
j=0
βjTt+j
whereGt is real government expenditure at time t (taken to be exogenous), Bt
is real government debt at time t, and β is the real discount factor, assumed
constant over time.
The first-order conditions necessary for optimal intertemporal monetary
and fiscal policy are [see Mankiw (1987)]
Et [f 0(τt+j)] = f 0(τt), (1)
Et [h0(πt+j)] = h0(πt), (2)
h0(πt) = kf 0(τt). (3)
The intertemporal first-order conditions (1) and (2) equate the marginal
social cost of taxation and inflation, respectively, today and in the future.
The static first-order condition (3), which relates the tax rate to the rate
of inflation, equates the marginal social cost of raising revenue through tax-
ation and the marginal social cost of raising revenue through seigniorage.
This last condition expresses a crucial implication of the theory of optimal
seigniorage. Increases in the government revenue requirement increase both
taxation and inflation. Hence, over time higher tax rates are associated with
higher inflation rates and higher nominal interest rates.
3
3 Econometric Methodology
As already noted, we test the theory of optimal seignioarge using the long-
horizon regression approach developed by Fisher and Seater (1993). One im-
portant advantage to working with the long-horizon regression approach is
that cointegration is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for tests on the long-run
derivative. We start with the following bivariate autoregressive representa-
tion
αππ(L)∆hπiπt = απτ(L)∆hτiτt + επt
αττ (L)∆hτiτt = ατπ(L)∆hπiπt + ετt
where α0ππ = α0ττ = 1, ∆ = 1−L, where L is the lag operator, π is the inflation
rate, τ is marginal tax rate, and hzi represents the order of integration of z, so
that if z is integrated of order γ, then hzi = γ and h∆zi = hzi−1. The vector
(επt , ετt )0 is assumed to be independently and identically distributed normal
with zero mean and covariance
P
ε, the elements of which are var(επt ), var(ετt ),
cov(επt , ετt ).
According to this approach, revenue smoothing can be tested in terms of
the long-run derivative of π with respect to a permanent change in τ , which
is defined as follows. If limk→∞ ∂τt+k/∂ετt 6= 0, then
LRDπ,τ = limk→∞
∂πt+k/∂ετt
∂τt+k/∂ετt
Thus, in the present context LRDπ,τ expresses the ultimate eﬀect of an
exogenous marginal tax rate disturbance on π, relative to that disturbance’s
ultimate eﬀect on the marginal tax rate τ . When limk→∞ ∂τt+k/∂ετt = 0,
there are no permanent changes in τ and thus LRDπ,τ is undefined. In terms
of this framework, revenue smoothing requires that LRDπ,τ = 1.
The above bivariate autoregressive system can be inverted to yield the
following vector moving average representation
∆hπiπt = θπτ(L)ετt + θππ(L)επt
∆hτiτt = θττ(L)ετt + θτπ(L)επt
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In terms of this moving average representation, Fisher and Seater (1993)
show that LRDπ,τ depends on hτi− hπi, as follows
LRDπ,τ =
(1− L)hτi−hπi θπτ(L)|L=1
θττ(1)
Hence, meaningful long-horizon regression tests of the revenue smoothing
hypothesis can be conducted if both πt and τt satisfy certain nonstationarity
conditions. In particular, long-horizon regression tests require that both πt
and τt are at least I(1) and of the same order of integration. In fact, when
hπi = hτi = 1, the long-run derivative becomes
LRDπ,τ =
θπτ(1)
θττ(1)
where θπτ(1) =
P∞
j=1 θjπτ and θττ(1) =
P∞
j=1 θjττ . Above, the coeﬃcient
θπτ(1)/θττ(1) is the long-run value of the impulse-response of π with respect
to τ , suggesting that LRDπ,τ can be interpreted as the long-run elasticity of
π with respect to τ .
Under the assumptions that cov(επt , ετt ) = 0 and that the marginal tax
rate is exogenous in the long-run, the coeﬃcient θπτ(1)/θττ(1) equals the
zero-frequency regression coeﬃcient in the regression of ∆hπiπ on ∆hτiτ –
see Fisher and Seater (1993, note 11). This estimator is given by limk→∞ bk,
where bk is the coeﬃcient from the regression


kX
j=0
∆hπiπt−j

 = ak + bk


kX
j=0
∆hτiτt−j

+ ekt
In fact, when hπi = hτi = 1, consistent estimates of bk can be derived by
applying ordinary least squares to the regression
πt − πt−k−1 = ak + bk [τt − τt−k−1] + ekt, k = 1, ...,K. (4)
The null of revenue smoothing is bk = 1. If the null is not rejected across a
range of k-forecast horizons, the data supports the theory of optimal seignior-
age.
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 The Data
We examine two variables in this paper – the inflation rate, πt, and the
average marginal tax rate, τt. As a measure of the average marginal tax rate
we use Stephenson’s (1998) average marginal eﬀective tax rate on personal
income (AMETR). The data is annual from 1934 to 1994 (a total of 61
observations).
It is to be noted that Mankiw (1987) mostly uses federal government re-
ceipts as a percent of GNP (TAX), as a measure of the average tax rate,
and his analysis is over the 1951 to 1985 period (that is, over 35 observa-
tions). He also uses the average marginal tax rate (MAR) on labor income
(including social security) as estimated by Barro and Sahasakul (1983), and
finds a positive relation to both the inflation rate and nominal interest rate.
However, only the relation to the nominal interest rate is statistically signif-
icant, with the coeﬃcient on MAR (in a regression of ∆INT on a constant
and ∆MAR) being 0.50.
Of course, as Mankiw (1987, p. 339) puts it “[i]t is not clear a priori
which of the two tax measures, TAX or MAR, is preferable. One might
argue that the average marginal tax rate is the best measure of the marginal
social cost of raising revenue. Yet consider what makes these two variables
diﬀerent. Changes in the mix of taxes, such as a shift between personal
and corporate taxes, would change MAR without changing TAX. It is not
obvious whether such a change in the tax mix should be associated with a
change in the reliance on seigniorage as a source of revenue. Resolving this
issue requires a model more extensive than that presented here.” With this in
mind, in what follows we use Stephenson’s (1998) average marginal eﬀective
tax rate on personal income (AMETR) as a measure of the average tax rate.
4.2 Integration Tests
As it was argued in the introduction, meaningful long-run revenue-smoothing
tests can only be conducted if both the πt and τt variables satisfy certain
nonstationarity conditions. In particular, revenue-smoothing tests require
that both πt and τt are at least integrated of order one and of the same order
of integration. Hence, the first step in conducting revenue-smoothing tests is
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to test for stochastic trends (unit roots) in the autoregressive representation
of each individual time series. In doing so, in what follows we use four
alternative testing procedures, to deal with anomalies that arise when the
data are not very informative about whether or not there is a unit root.
In Table 1 we report p-values [based on the response surface estimates
given by MacKinnon (1994)] for the augmented Weighted Symmetric (WS)
unit root test [see Pantula et al. (1994)], the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
test [see Dickey and Fuller (1981)], and the nonparametric, Z(tbα), test of
Phillips (1987) and Phillips and Perron (1988). We also report the KPSS
[see Kwiatkowski et al. (1992)] bηµ and bητ t-statistics.1 For the WS and ADF
tests, the optimal lag length is taken to be the order selected by the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) plus 2 - see Pantula et al. (1994) for details
regarding the advantages of this rule for choosing the number of augmenting
lags. The Z(tbα) test is done with the same Dickey-Fuller regression variables,
using no augmenting lags.
Table 1. Unit Root Tests in the Levels
p-values KPSS
Variable WS ADF Z(tbα) bηµ bητ
πt .666 .741 .072 .154 .081
τt .946 .128 .501 .671 .146
Notes: Numbers in the WS, ADF, and Z(tbα) columns
are tail areas of tests.
Based on the p-values for the WS, ADF, and Z(tbα) unit root tests reported
in Table 1, the null hypothesis of a unit root in levels cannot be rejected. Also,
the t-statistic bηµ that tests the null hypothesis of level stationarity is large
1Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) argue that unit root tests have low power against rele-
vant alternatives and they propose tests (known as the KPSS tests) of the hypothesis
of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root. They argue that such tests should
complement unit root tests and that by testing both the unit root hypothesis and the
stationarity hypothesis, one can distinguish series that appear to be stationary, series that
appear to be integrated, and series that are not very informative about whether or not
they are stationary or have a unit root.
7
relative to the 5% critical value of .463 given in Kwiatkowski et al. (1992),
for the τt series. However, the t-statistic bητ that tests the null hypothesis of
trend stationarity does not exceed the 5% critical value of .146 [also given
in Kwiatkowski et al. (1992)], for both series. Although the series do not
appear to be very informative as to their integration properties, combining
the results of our tests of the stationarity hypothesis with the results of our
tests of the unit root hypothesis, we conclude that both series have at least
one unit root.
To test the null hypothesis of a second unit root, in Table 2 we test the
null hypothesis of a unit root [using the WS, ADF, and Z(tbα) tests] as well
as the null hypotheses of level and trend stationarity in the first diﬀerences
of the series. Clearly, the diﬀerenced series appear to be stationary, since the
unit root null is rejected and the level and trend stationarity null hypotheses
cannot be rejected.
Table 2. Unit Root Tests in the First Diﬀerences of Levels
p-values KPSS
Variable WS ADF Z(tbα) bηµ bητ
∆πt .000 .000 .000 .136 .086
∆τt .003 .000 .074 .296 .081
Notes: Numbers in the WS, ADF, and Z(tbα) columns
are tail areas of tests.
4.3 Cointegration Tests
Although cointegration is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for tests on the
long-run derivative, for information purposes we also test the null hypothesis
of no cointegration (against the alternative of cointegration) between πt and
τt using the Engle and Granger (1987) two-step procedure. In particular,
we regress one variable against the other (including a constant and a trend
variable in the regression) to obtain the OLS regression residuals bζt. A test
of the null hypothesis of no cointegration is then based on testing for a unit
root in bζt, using the ADF test (with the number of augmenting lags being
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chosen based on the AIC+2 rule mentioned earlier) and asymptotic p-values
using the coeﬃcients in MacKinnon (1994).
The cointegration tests are first done with πt as the dependent variable
in the cointegrating regression and then repeated with τt as the dependent
variable.2. When πt is the dependent variable the p-value of the null hypoth-
esis of no cointegration is .511 and when τt is the dependent variable the
p-value is .143. Clearly, the null hypothesis of no cointegration between πt
and τt cannot be rejected (at the 5% level).
4.4 Long-Horizon Regression Tests
We start by estimating equation (4) for values of k ranging from 1 to 30, as in
Fisher and Seater (1993), and present the estimates of bk along with the 95%
confidence bands [using the Newey and West (1987) procedure] in Figure 1.
The evidence shows that the null hypothesis that bk = 1 can be rejected for
any k ∈ [1, 30]. Thus, we find strong evidence that revenue-smoothing does
not hold.
To investigate the robustness of this result, we also examine the relation-
ship between the three-month Treasury bill rate, Rt, and τt. In particular,
we investigate the univariate time series properties of Rt and ∆Rt, we test for
cointegration between Rt and τt, and estimate equation (4) with Rt−Rt−k−1
as the dependent variable. The integration tests in Table 3 indicate that the
time series properties of Rt are very similar to those of τt, investigated in
Tables 1 and 2. Also, when we test the null hypothesis of no cointegration
between Rt and τt, we cannot reject the null (irrespective of which variable
is treated as the dependent variable).
Finally, we present the estimates of bk along with the 95% confidence
bands in Figure 2. The evidence shows that again the null hypothesis that
bk = 1 can be rejected for most values of k ∈ [1, 30].
2We should wary of a result indicating cointegration using one series as the dependent
variable, but no cointegration when the other series is used as the dependent variable.
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Table 3. Unit Root Tests in Rt and ∆Rt
p-values KPSS
Variable WS ADF Z(tbα) bηµ bητ
Rt .575 .730 .396 .690 .101
∆Rt .000 .000 .001 .159 .115
Notes: Numbers in the WS, ADF, and Z(tbα) columns
are tail areas of tests.
5 Conclusion
We have tested the revenue-smoothing hypothesis using annual data for
the United States over the period from 1934 to 1994. In doing so, we
have used the Fisher and Seater (1993) methodology, paying particular at-
tention to the integration properties of the data, since meaningful long-
horizon refression tests critically depend on these properties. Overall, al-
though Mankiw (1987) and Poterba and Rotemberg (1990) found evidence
supporting revenue-smoothing in the United States using contemporaneous
ordinary least squares regressions, the evidence presented here, as well as in
Trehan and Walsh (1990), Ghosh (1995), Evans and Amey (1996), and Ser-
letis and Schorn (1999), does not support the theory of optimal seigniorage.
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Figure 1.  The LRD for the Inflation Rate
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Figure 2.  The LRD for the Interest Rate
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